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Abstract
The structure of farming activity under the provisions of the generalized
regime of the Common Agricultural Policy involving both the ￿rst and second
pillar elements is modelled. Independently of whether regulated agents exhibit
unbounded or bounded rationality, the impact of the di⁄erent type of CAP
measures, as prescribed by Agenda 2000, in the decision making - and thus
on the environmental performance of a homogeneous population of farmers -
are discussed. The problem of a representative farmer is used for this purpose.
After assessing the environmental e⁄ectiveness of the various CAP regimes,
the mechanism that provides the type of CAP instruments that safeguard the
collective attainment of a social environmental target, along with the type of
interdependence characterizing them, is de￿ned under the analytical framework
of unboundedly and boundedly rational agents respectively. The problem of the
optimal regulation of an unboundedly rational population of farmers is discussed
in both a static and a dynamic context. The long-run viability of the Agenda
2000 CAP reform is also examined under the assumption of bounded rationality
by employing the evolutionary framework of replicator dynamics.
Keywords: Environmental impacts, coupling, decoupling, production sub-
sidy, direct payment, cross-compliance principle, rural development subsidy.
JEL Classi￿cation: Q18, Q51.
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11 European Environment under the CAP Regime
Despite their bene￿cial environmental services, European agriculture is associ-
ated with a series of adverse environmental e⁄ects.2 Among the factors creating
the unbalance between agriculture and environment, CAP measures are consid-
ered of primary importance.3 Supports linked with output levels (coupled pay-
ments) increased production to levels that would not have occurred otherwise,
resulting into intensi￿cation, specialization, expansion of cultivated areas and
rise in livestock numbers (Baldock et al., 2002). Even though coupled payments
have not yet been cancelled by EU market policy (Pillar I), the Commission
circularly admitted in 1988 that such a price policy is liable for environmental
damages (Fennel, 1997) and decided to reorganize CAP as a response to the
wider demand for an environmentally oriented CAP.
The major element of the 1992 or McSharry CAP reform was the gradual
reduction or even elimination of production subsidies and the introduction of
direct aid payments, provided per hectare (decoupling) to compensate farmers
for support price cuts (EC, 2003). The substitution of price support measures
by decoupled payments was continued by the 1999 or Agenda 2000 reform,
which makes direct aid payments conditional to environmental aims (i.e. hor-
izontal regulation). A long-term set-aside mechanism4 was proposed and a
package of rural development measures (Pillar II)5 was promoted to comple-
ment reforms of common market organizations (CMOs) and internalize major
environmental considerations. To maximize environmental bene￿ts, both direct
and pillar II payments are subject to the cross-compliance principle, a sanction-
ing approach incorporated in horizontal regulation that involves proportionate
penalties for environmental infringements entailing, where appropriate, partial
or full removal of aid in the event of deviation from certain farming standards
(EC, 1999). Finally, dynamic modulation involves the transfer of funds released
2Among the bene￿cial services are classi￿ed the decline of greenhouse emissions and the
gains to biodiversity, while among the adverse services are the loss of landscape diversity
and quality, as well as the deterioration of important habitats. For further details about the
bene￿cial and adverse environmental services of agriculture, see Baldock et al. (2002).
3The driving forces of such an unbalance are: (i) changes in market conditions (i.e. input
prices), (ii) commercial considerations (i.e. pro￿t maximization), (iii) institutional changes,
(iv) technology development, (v) economic and social changes in rural areas (i.e. cost of labour,
population mobility), (vi) independent and partly endogenous environmental changes (i.e.
global warming), as well as (vii) public policy measures of CAP or in di⁄erent policy realms
(i.e. land ownership, food safety) (Baldock et al., 2002). Furthermore, among the factors
that contribute to agricultural pollution are also classi￿ed the imperfect knowledge about the
(i) land attributes (i.e. soil moisture and fertility level) (Johnson et al., 1991), (ii) location
physical attributes (Wu and Babcock, 2001), as well as (iii) the operating characteristics of
the activity (i.e. farming experience, education) (Wu and Babcock, 2001).
4Farmers setting-aside their arable land for ten years are eligible for direct payments de-
pendent on this requirement. Non-food crops (i.e. energy crops) can be cultivated on this
land (EC, 2004a).
5Under Pillar II, aid is provided for (i) early retirement, (ii) set-up of young farmers, (iii)
rea⁄orestation of agricultural land, (iv) compensatory payments for mountainous and other
less-favoured areas, (v) agri-environmental programs, (vi) vocational training, (vii) improv-
ing processing and marketing of agricultural products, and (viii) investment in agricultural
holdings (EC, 2004a).
2from the compulsory reduction of market policy payments to rural development
measures contributing to environmentally benign practices. The reforms were
strengthened by the 2003 or Mid-term review CAP reform, which introduced
a single payment scheme based on direct payments received during the period
2000-2002 and the hectares entitled for those payments, as well as rede￿ning the
cross-compliance principle to make it dependent on the detected noncompliance
type (EC, 2004b).6
The major element of the 1992 or McSharry CAP reform was the gradual
reduction or even elimination of production subsidies and the introduction of
direct aid payments, provided per hectare (decoupling) to compensate farmers
for support price cuts (EC, 2003). The substitution of price support measures
by decoupled payments was continued by the 1999 or Agenda 2000 reform,
which makes direct aid payments conditional to environmental aims (i.e. hor-
izontal regulation). A long-term set-aside mechanism7 was proposed and a
package of rural development measures (Pillar II)8 was promoted to comple-
ment reforms of common market organizations (CMOs) and internalize major
environmental considerations. To maximize environmental bene￿ts, both direct
and pillar II payments are subject to the cross-compliance principle, a sanction-
ing approach incorporated in horizontal regulation that involves proportionate
penalties for environmental infringements entailing, where appropriate, partial
or full removal of aid in the event of deviation from certain farming standards
(EC, 1999). Finally, dynamic modulation involves the transfer of funds released
from the compulsory reduction of market policy payments to rural development
measures contributing to environmentally benign practices. The reforms were
strengthened by the 2003 or Mid-term review CAP reform, which introduced
a single payment scheme based on direct payments received during the period
2000-2002 and the hectares entitled for those payments, as well as rede￿ning the
cross-compliance principle to make it dependent on the detected noncompliance
type (EC, 2004b).9
Agenda 2000 is known as the "Green CAP" because of the belief that it
brings greater quality to environmental integration. However, the theoretical
analysis of this regime has been rather limited and its environmental impacts
have not yet been fully assessed to justify such a characterization. Hence, the
intention of this section is to assess the impact of the various pillar I and pillar
6Particularly, if a farmer fails to comply with standards due to negligence, then the reduc-
tion of payments varies between 5% and 15%, while payments are reduced by at least 20%
and may also be completely withdrawn in the event of deliberate noncompliance.
7Farmers setting-aside their arable land for ten years are eligible for direct payments de-
pendent on this requirement. Non-food crops (i.e. energy crops) can be cultivated on this
land (EC, 2004a).
8Under Pillar II, aid is provided for (i) early retirement, (ii) set-up of young farmers, (iii)
rea⁄orestation of agricultural land, (iv) compensatory payments for mountainous and other
less-favoured areas, (v) agri-environmental programs, (vi) vocational training, (vii) improv-
ing processing and marketing of agricultural products, and (viii) investment in agricultural
holdings (EC, 2004a).
9Particularly, if a farmer fails to comply with standards due to negligence, then the reduc-
tion of payments varies between 5% and 15%, while payments are reduced by at least 20%
and may also be completely withdrawn in the event of deliberate noncompliance.
3II policy instruments, as foreseen by the 1999 CAP reform, on the environmen-
tal performance of a homogeneous population of farmers de￿ned in terms of
equilibrium production choices of a representative farmer. Moreover, it aims at
evaluating the e⁄ectiveness of the given CAP reform to stimulate compliance
of an entire population of either unboundedly or boundedly rational farmers
with a socially desirable environmental target. This is achieved by considering
the mechanism that provides the type of the CAP instruments, along with the
type of interdependence characterizing them which guarantees the achievement
of such a target.10
To do so a conceptual, theoretical framework describing farming behaviour
under the Agenda 2000 provisions is developed, by considering a homogeneous
population of farmers where each farmer is eligible for a production subsidy
and two types of direct payments provided for alternative land treatments: (i)
cultivation and (ii) set-aside. The given ￿nancial provisions are granted to each
European farmer through a public voluntary program,11 in the form of a formal
contract between the entitled farmer and the Commission. Given the attain-
ment costs of environmental requirements incorporated in direct payments, two
strategies are considered: compliance with and deviation from farming stan-
dards. A deviating strategy can be detected via random inspections,12 given
the non-point-source characteristics of agricultural pollution, and deterred via
the enforcement of the cross-compliance principle.
Given the generalized nature of the provided farm model, the di⁄erent CAP
regimes associated with common market organizations are reproduced under
the proper simplifying assumptions, allowing comparisons between regimes in
terms of farmers￿equilibrium production choices, independent of the rational-
ity assumptions. The examined CAP regimes associated with CMOs are: (i)
full coupling regime that involves only production subsidies independent of en-
vironmental requirements, (ii) partial decoupling regime, involving coupled and
decoupled payments, and (iii) full decoupling regime, that provides only direct
payments. The unregulated regime, providing neither coupled nor decoupled
payments, is employed as a benchmark regime. To assess whether and how
production choices are altered by the introduction of farming standards and
the cross-compliance principle, the partially and fully decoupled regimes are
examined under the absence and presence of such considerations. Likewise the
compliant and deviating strategy is compared in terms of equilibrium input and
land usage values.
To examine the Commission￿ s perception that rural development measures
10Under unbounded rationality agents adopt an optimizing behavioural rule and behave as if
they had all the necessary data and skills to calculate the optimum response (Binmore, 1992),
while under bounded rationality agents have imperfect information about payo⁄s, they are
unable to compute the optimal strategy and choose between predetermined strategies (Noailly
et al., 2003).
11For further details about the elements of the particular voluntary programs,
see EC (2004b; 2007) or visit the o¢ cial site of the European Commission:
www.europa.eu/pol/agr/index_en.htm
12The simultaneous inspection of the entire population of farmers within a given geograph-
ical region is a technically very demanding task and potentially prohibitively costly.
4enhance further the "green" character of Agenda 2000, it is considered that
the land quality target is attained either by restricting main production choices
(inputs, land and labour) or by treating them in an environmentally benign way
through secondary production choices (treatments on input usage etc.). Such
treatments can either be self-￿nanced fully or partially through an RD program -
that is actually a public voluntary program - providing a set of subsidies per unit
of established treatments subject to farming standards and the cross-compliance
principle. The extended farm model is employed to examine the environmental
performance of farmers￿population when CAP regimes are extended with Pillar
II payments (i.e. extended full coupling, partial and full decoupling regime).
The perception that CAP, as shaped by Agenda 2000, achieves the integra-
tion of environmental considerations into individual and thus collective farming
behaviour is not supported strongly by the results of our analysis. Comparative
static analysis shows that even though the reduction of coupled payments and
the incorporation of environmental constraints induce the population of poten-
tially deviating farmers to restrict production choices, the ￿nal impact of direct
payments and the compliance enforcement mechanism on these choices is am-
biguous. The comparison of strategies also indicated that direct payments and
the compliance enforcement mechanism may not be su¢ cient to induce deviat-
ing farmers to alter their production choices and adopt a strategy approaching
(or even matching with) the compliant strategy.
Nonintervention is preferable on environmental grounds to intervention via
production subsidies, justifying the wide criticism of coupled payments. How-
ever, the environmental performance of the regulated farmers under the Agenda
2000 regimes (partial or full decoupling) can not be clearly shown to be supe-
rior to the performance resulting under the unregulated and full coupling regime
both under the compliant and non-compliant strategy. Even though both the
partial and full decoupling regimes involve less input usage, there is uncertainty
about their relative impact on the set-aside decision of farmers￿population given
that direct payments are provided on con￿ icting land usages. The fully decou-
pled regime is environmentally superior in terms of both production choices
(i.e. input and land usage) to the regime involving both coupled and decoupled
payments, justifying the Commission￿ s decision to proceed with the full cancel-
lation of coupled payments. However, the relative environmental performance
of the regulated population under these intervention regimes becomes ambigu-
ous when examined in terms of both main and secondary production choices.
The prospect that the transition from the partial and full decoupling regime
to the rural development regime may forestall the further deterioration of the
agricultural environment and proceed further in the reconstruction of the qual-
ity of the agricultural landscape, as indicated by the Mid-term review, is not
veri￿able by our theoretical model. Finally, the environmental performance of
the population of farmers under the partially and fully decoupled regimes can
be further enhanced by the incorporation of environmental considerations and
rural development payments, justifying the Commission￿ s decision to embody
pillar II in CAP.
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is the fraction of gross land used for cultivation and bF
i the
remaining fraction voluntarily set aside (non-production case). For simplicity ￿
1 ￿ bF
i
￿ ￿ Li = Lc
i.
Crop yields are given by:
yi = f(xij;Lc
i) (1)
where xij is the vector of input choices among a set of j = 1;:::;m inputs.13




that is positively correlated to production.14
In the absence of regulatory intervention the payo⁄ function is:
￿i = Pf(xij;Lc
i) ￿ wjxij
where P is the output price and wj the vector of input prices in the competitive
market respectively.15
Under Agenda 2000 the given crop is eligible both for a production subsidy
(s) and two types of direct aid payments (DPs) coupled with the alternative
and con￿ icting land usages, distinguished into:
- A direct payment DP1 granted on the basis of cultivated land
Lc






where ￿1 is the premium provided per hectare of cultivated land.
- A direct payment DP2 granted on the basis of set-aside land
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
￿
: DP2 = ￿2




where ￿2 is the premium granted per hectare of set-aside land and
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
￿
the size of the voluntarily set-aside land. The Commission has de￿ned a
13It holds fx;fLc > 0 and fxx;fLcLc < 0, indicating that crop yields are increasing both
in input and land usage, whilst display diminishing returns in both x and Lc. It is considered
that xij and Lc are complements, in the sense that fxLc > 0, a fact that involves that the
marginal product of x is increasing to increases of Lc. Alternatively fbF < 0 and fbF bF < 0.
14It holds ex;eLc > 0 and exx;eLcLc > 0, with exLc > 0 given that xij and Lc are treated
as complements. Alternatively ebF < 0 and ebF > 0.
15Land is not included in the vector since it is owned by the farmer.










Based on the horizontal regulation, direct payments are conditional on en-
vironmental requirements:
- DP1 is subject to an individual land quality standard, assumed to be
expressed by the following constraint:
Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi (3)
where Qi is a decreasing function of emissions￿￿ ows17 indicating the possi-
bility of strategic interactions among farmers within a geographical area.
A typical example of such interaction is the upstream and downstream
farmer.18
- DP2 is conditional to a land usage constraint:
bF ￿ bR or Lc
i ￿ ~ Lc (4)
where the constraint constant ~ Lc = (1 ￿ bR)￿ Li represents the maximum
permissible size of cultivated land.
Incentives not to attain environmental requirements arise from the non-
point-source character of agricultural pollution. The fact that individual pro-
duction choices are not directly observed by a third party (i.e. regulator) allows
individual farmers to retain production choices unchanged and thus avert pro￿t
losses that compliance with (3) and (4) entails.19 Such a deviation from given
performance standards cannot always be attributed to deliberate actions but
rather sometimes to farmers￿negligence to comply. In any case deliberate and
negligent deviating behaviour can be detected via the realization of a number
of random inspections, given the regulator￿ s inability to inspect simultaneously
the entire population of farmers receiving direct payments.
Such a deviating behaviour can be detected under a certain probability and
further deterred via the principle of cross-compliance, which involves reduction
or even cancellation of provided direct payments by the amounts:
DP1￿( ￿ Qi ￿ Qi) and DP2￿(Lc
i ￿ ~ Lc)
16The additional range can be eligible for a DP through an RD program, providing com-
pensation for the a⁄orestation of agricultural land (EC, 2004a).
17Given that Qei;Qeiei < 0 it holds that Qx;QLc < 0 and Qxx;QLcLc < 0, with QxLc > 0.
Alternatively, QbF > 0 and QbF bF < 0.
18Note that in an area characterised by a steep slope the land quality valuation of a farmer
located on the top of a hill cannot be adversely a⁄ected by the emission ￿ows of a farmer
located at the bottom.
19The attainment of the land quality target requires the restricted use of inputs xij and /
or of cultivated land Lc, resulting into a reduction in crop yields. Similarly, the attainnment
of the land usage target imposes restrictions on the size of cultivated land, also involving
reduction in crop yields.
7where ￿ 2 [0;1] denotes the reduction rate. The ￿nal reduction of DPs is
proportional to deviations from the constraint constant. Hence the higher the
deviation is, the more evident deliberate noncompliance, justifying the higher
reduction of DPs as foreseen by the 2003 CAP reform.
3 Alternative Behavioral Strategies under the
CMOs CAP Regime
Under a CAP regime involving performance standards and a compliance en-
forcement mechanism, two behavioural rules can be distinguished, depending
on farmers￿attitude towards environmental constraints. If constraints (3) and
(4) enter farmer i￿ s pro￿t maximization problem, then the compliant strategy
is considered, while if the constraints do not enter the problem, the possibility
of noncompliance with environmental standards is considered and the deviating
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i + ￿2






i ￿ ~ Lc




i = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
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represent the net percentage
of direct payments provided after the detection of deviation from the imposed
constraints and the enforcement of cross-compliance principle.
The generalized nature of the described CAP regime21 allows the de￿nition
of the di⁄erent CAP regimes via the proper simplifying assumptions. Hence,
the environmental performance of the homogeneous population of farmers can
20In the absence of farming standards there is no distinction between compliant and deviat-
ing farmer. The maximization problem reduces into: maxx;bF ￿i = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
i) ￿
wjxij + DP1 + DP2 , where Pillar I payments (s;￿1;￿2), environmental considerations ￿
￿ Qi; ~ Lc
￿
and the compliance enforcement mechanism (p;￿) are considered to be uniform
for every farmer.
21It is the regime of partial decoupling denoted below by the indication (3b).





and inputs usage (xij) through
the problem of a representative farmer i. The analyzed CAP regimes are:
1. Unregulated competitive regime: s = 0 and ￿1;￿2 = 0. It is the prior-
CAP regime or a CAP regime characterized by nonprovision of Pillar I
payments.
2. Full coupling regime: s > 0 and ￿1;￿2 = 0. It is the old regime providing
production subsidies independent of farming standards.
3. Partial decoupled regime: s > 0 and ￿1;￿2 > 0. It is the current regime
involving both coupled and decoupled payments, the performance of which
is examined under:22
(a) Absence of land quality and land usage constraints.23
(b) Existence of land quality and land usage constraints.
to verify the perception that the link of decoupled payments with envi-
ronmental constraints restrains farmers￿production choices.
4. Full decoupled regime: s = 0 and ￿1;￿2 > 0. It can be viewed as the
forthcoming regime, involving complete cancellation of coupled payments
and provision only of direct payments.24 Its performance is examined both
under the (a) absence and (b) existence of farming standards.25
3.1 The Maximization Problem under the Compliant Strat-
egy
Given the production choices of the other farmers, farmer i considers, given the
choices of the rest farmers, the problem (5) and maximizes the Langrangean
function:
L(xij;bF;￿1;￿2) = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
i) ￿ wjxij + ￿1Lc
i + ￿2









~ Lc ￿ Lc
i
i
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions of the problem are given by:
22Limited production aid and a supplementary per hectare aid is foreseen for some crop
types such as rice, nuts and some protein crops (EC, 2004a).
23When examing the performance of the given CAP regime under the deviating rule, the
subcase a) is analogous to examining the case of nonenforcement of environmental standards
in the sense either that no farmer is inspected (i:e: p = 0), or if inspected and found to be
deviating from given standards, then no reduction of DPs occurs (i:e: ￿ = 0).
24This regime already applies for cereals, oilseeds, protein crops, grain legumes, potatoes
for starch production, beef, veal and sheepmeat (EC, 2004a).
25The Mid-term CAP regime is identical to the full decoupling regime since it involves the
provision of DPs and a single farm payment that is a ￿xed amount given that it depends on
direct payments received during the period 2000-2002 and the number of hectares eligible for
those payments, leaving thus the analysis una⁄ected.
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< 0 if bF
i￿ = 0
FOC￿1 : Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi = 0 if ￿1 > 0
or Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi > 0 if ￿1 = 0
FOC￿2 : ~ Lc ￿ Lc
i￿ = 0 if ￿2 > 0
or ~ Lc ￿ Lc
i￿ > 0 if ￿2 = 0
By the Envelop Theorem the Langrangean multipliers ￿1 and ￿2 express the
marginal cost and bene￿t resulting from a change in the land quality and usage
constraint constant, ￿ Qi and ~ Lc respectively.
Conditions (7) and (8) provide the Nash equilibrium input usage x￿
ij and
set-aside bF
i￿ values under the compliant behavioural rule, assuming that such a




According to condition (7) farmer i applies input xij up to the point where
the marginal revenues from production equate with the marginal costs from the






. In the same context condition (8) equates marginal revenues in
terms of set-aside premium, shadow savings due to compliance with the land










ginal costs in terms of foregone market revenues and foregone land usage pre-
mium.
Comparative static analysis indicated that changes in the value of provided
CAP payments leave una⁄ected the optimum production choices if constraints
(3) and (4) are binding. On the other hand, if constraints are nonbinding then
the optimum production choices of the population of compliant farmers are
a⁄ected by marginal changes in the magnitude of coupled and decoupled direct
premiums. Particularly:
Proposition 1 The environmental performance of the population of compliant
farmers is enhanced if the CAP regime is characterised by (i) a reduced produc-
tion subsidy, (ii) reduced land-usage payments, and (iii) an increased land-aside
26The su¢ cient conditions for maximum are considered to be satis￿ed.
10direct premium, facts that restrict the optimum production choices under the
compliant strategy.
Indeed the gradual reduction of both production subsidies and land usage
direct payments is foreseen by the current structure of CAP via the princi-
ple of dynamic modulation. However, the same principle also involves gradual
reduction of set-aside direct payments, introducing uncertainty about the ￿nal
impact of the current structure of CAP on the environmental performance of the
representative compliant farmer and thus on the performance of the associated
population.
3.2 Pro￿t Maximization under the Deviating Strategy
Under the deviating strategy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
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￿ 2
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< 0 if bF
i# = 0




i# values under the deviating behavioural rule, as provided by
conditions (9) and (10), are given by:27
x
#
ij(P;wj;s;￿1;￿2;￿;bR; ￿ Qi;p) and bF
#(P;wj;s;￿1;￿2;￿;bR; ￿ Qi;p)
According to condition (9) inputs are applied up to the point where mar-
ginal revenues from production equal the marginal costs from input purchase
and the reduction of DP1 due to both detection of deviation from the land
quality constraint and enforcement of the cross-compliance principle. Similarly
condition (10) de￿nes the set-aside fraction that equates marginal revenues from














, with marginal costs in terms
of foregone market revenues and land usage premium. The last term can either
re￿ ect a marginal cost or revenue depending on the relative size of the voluntary
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
￿
and compulsory set-aside land
￿




27It is assumed that the second-order su¢ cient conditions are satis￿ed.
11Comparative statics analysis indicated that the ￿nal impact of the current
structure of CAP on the environmental performance of the population of devi-






of the various measures of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform. Even
though a reduced production subsidy, along with increased constraint constants
bR and ￿ Qi, restricts the equilibrium production choices under the deviating
strategy,28 the impact of direct premiums (￿1;￿2) and the compliance enforce-
ment mechanism (￿;p) is ambiguous. Hence:
Proposition 2 The environmental behaviour of the population of deviating farm-
ers is enhanced if the structure of CAP is characterised by:
i) An increased land set-aside premium and a stringent compliance en-
forcement mechanism if the condition
￿










ii) An invariant land set-aside premium and compliance enforcement
mechanism if the condition
￿










iii) An invariant land-usage premium independent of the relative mag-
nitude of









If the inspections to verify compliance with environmental standards bR and
￿ Qi are realized by independent regulatory bodies, then both the inspection
probability p and the cross-compliance reduction rate ￿ may be di⁄erentiated
across the direct payments of CAP, DP1 and DP2. In such a case a strict
enforcement mechanism (p1;￿1) associated with the land quality direct payment
(DP1) stimulates reduced input and land usage, while in the case of the land
usage direct payment (DP2) the relative impact of (p2;￿2) remains dependent
on the relative magnitude of the voluntarily and mandatorily set-aside land.
4 Assessment of CAP Regimes associated with
CMOs and Behavioural Strategies
Consider two CAP regimes, given as g and h, that involve di⁄erent type of













of regime h, the optimality
28Under the assumption that Fxbf < 0 the results of comparative static analysis are sum-
marized in:
s ￿1 ￿2 ￿ bR ￿ Qi p
x
#
ij + ? ￿ (?) ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ ￿ (?)
bF
# ￿ ? + (?) + (?) + + + (?)
where the impact of (￿2;￿;p) on production choices is clearly assessed if
￿




















then their impact is uncertain as




bf of the initial regime are evaluated at the equilibrium









If both expressions are zero then the compared CAP regimes involve the same
production choices and thus are identical in environmental terms, while if the
expressions are nonzero then deviation in the equilibrium production choices,
and thus in the environmental performance, of the regulated population occurs.
The performance of the population of farmers under regime g is environmentally


















while in the opposite case its performance is environmentally superior.
The mechanism operates in the following way. Assume that under each CAP
regime the optimality conditions yield a unique solution that is de￿ned as:30
(~ xi;~ b
f
i ) : ￿x(~ xi;~ b
f
i ) = 0 and ￿bf(~ xi;~ b
f
i ) = 0
implying that the farmer i uses both ~ xi and ~ Lc
i up to the point that marginal















When optimality conditions are evaluated at another pair of production












, then there is a divergence be-
tween marginal costs and revenues, a fact that involves nonattainment of max-
imum payo⁄s. Therefore, if the optimality condition with respect to input us-




ih) > 0, this implies that the pro￿ts are increasing at the production
choices of regime h and therefore these values do not yield the maximum pro￿ts.



















indicating that there is room for a further increase of input usage. The given
production choice under regime h falls behind the pro￿t maximizing produc-
tion choice, in the sense that xih < ~ xig. Hence, regime g is considered to be




ih) < 0 then pro￿ts are decreasing at the production choices of regime
h and therefore this regime is characterized by excess input use.







ih) = 0 due to the ￿rst-order conditions.
30This involves that both optimality conditions have a global maximum at ~ xi and ~ b
f
i re-
spectively, and they can be both illustrated by an inverse ￿U￿curve.
31Analysis is carried out both under the compliant and deviating strategy, providing the













indication modi￿ed under the deviating strategy denoted in parentheses.
13￿x
g










g n h 2 3a 3b 4a 4b 2 3a 3b 4a 4b
1 ￿ ￿ ? 0 + + ? ? ? ?
2 0 + + + ? ? ? ?
3a + + + ￿ (?) ￿ ￿
3b ? + ? ￿
4a + ￿ (?)
(1) unregulated competitive regime (UN), (2) full coupling regime
(FC), (3) partial decoupled regime (PD) under the absence (3a)
and presence (3b) of land quality and usage constraints, (4) full
decoupled regime (FD) under the (4a) absence and (4b) existence of
environmental considerations.32
Nonintervention (UN) is preferable on environmental grounds to interven-
tion via coupled payments (FC), since it can be veri￿ed that the population of















































Even though the FC regime is clearly environmentally inferior compared to
the rest of the CAP regimes in terms of input usage, the relative performance
of the population of both compliant and deviating farmers in set-aside terms is
ambiguous. Hence:
Conclusion 3 There is no clear evidence that the transition from the FC regime
to the regime of partially or fully decoupled payments (i.e. Agenda 2000 regimes)
can induce the population of regulated farmers to enhance their environmental
performance compared to the old regime with respect to the land set-aside deci-
sion, whilst there is evidence that the transition has led to an environmentally
superior performance of farmers with respect to the input usage.
In the same context:
Conclusion 4 Intervention via decoupled payments (FD) is environmentally
preferable in terms of both inputs and set-aside to intervention via a combination
32Indication (￿) in the ￿x
g
h table implies that regime h involves higher input usage, while
the same indication in the ￿
￿
bf￿g
h table denotes that regime h sets aside more land. Indication
(0) denotes that the examined regimes involve the same level of the given production choice,
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14of coupled and decoupled payments (PD), under both the absence and presence
of farming standards, indicating the distorting role of production subsidies on
farmers￿production choices.
The incorporation of such standards within the direct payment regime has
enhanced the environmental performance of the population of compliant farm-
ers under both the PD and FD regimes, while there is uncertainty about their
exact impact on the production choices of the population of deviating farmers.
Undoubtedly the provision of DPs, as well as the introduction of farming con-
straints, restrain input usage compared to the UN and FC regimes, however
their ￿nal impact on the set-aside decision is ambiguous given that DPs are
associated with con￿ icting land usages.
The given procedure is further employed to compare the compliant and de-
viating strategy by evaluating the optimality conditions of the representative
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￿ Li ￿ ~ Lc
￿i
As it can be seen by conditions (11) and (12), if the partial or full decoupling
CAP regime is characterized by non-enforcement of constraints, in the sense that
either no inspection is realized to verify compliance (i:e: p = 0) or no detected
deviating farmer is penalized (i:e: ￿ = 0), 0), then the deviating strategy is










































indicating that the deviating strategy involves higher usage of both inputs xi
and land Lc. Such an environmentally inferior behaviour may also be observed
even under the existence of a compliance enforcement mechanism, indicating
that the introduction of such an enforcement mechanism by Agenda 2000 may
not su¢ cient to induce the adoption by the regulated population of a behaviour
tending to the compliant rule. In particular, if p;￿ are su¢ ciently small, in the
sense that p;￿ ￿ 0, then the deviating strategy involves higher input and land






















i ￿ ￿2g > p￿
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￿ Li ￿ ~ Lc
￿i
and











i ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2p￿





￿ Li ￿ ~ Lc
￿io
> ￿1p￿













￿ Li ￿ ~ Lc
￿
Hence, it can be concluded that:
Conclusion 5 In the absence of the cross-compliance mechanism or even un-
der the existence of a lax enforcement mechanism, the relationship between the


















i# if p or ￿ ￿ 0
where ;p are su¢ ciently small if considered to be nonzero.34
Under the generalized CAP regime the signs of (11) and (12) are uncertain,
implying that in equilibrium the deviating strategy may involve less input and
land usage to the compliant rule. In particular, the deviating farmer applies less
inputs compared to a compliant farmer either if the land quality constraint (3) is
nonbinding involving ￿1 = 0, or if the marginal costs resulting from a marginal
increase of input usage de￿ned in terms of forgone direct payment on land usage
are higher than the associated marginal bene￿ts resulting from the nonattain-



















ilarly the deviating strategy involves higher set-aside fraction if the associated
cost-bene￿t analysis indicates that a marginal decrease in the size of cultivated







5 The Farm Model under the CAP Regime as-
sociated with Rural Development




i; ￿ L ￿ Lc
i;‘i)
34Moreover, the same inequalities are expected to occur either under the absence of a regime
of direct payment or under the existence of a lax regime of direct payments.
16where ‘ represents either hired or family labor.
Given the environmental requirements incorporated in DP1, the population
of farmers complies with the land quality constraint ￿ Qi by either restricting main
production choices (xij;Lc
i;‘i) or by treating them in an environmentally benign
way via secondary production choices that are disassociated by production but







vector of the secondary production choices established by farmer i, which are
distinguished into:
tx
i Treatments on input usage (i.e. advanced irrigation) reduce the impact
of inputs on emission ￿ ows as if the farmer has employed fewer inputs in
production. Given that @ei
@xij > 0, the vector of vector of e⁄ective input
















im) is the vector of undertaken treatments per
unit of input used.
tc
i Treatments of cultivated land (i.e. contour farming, conservation tillage,
terracing) reduce emission ￿ ows as if the farmer had set less land into
production. Given that @ei
@Lc > 0, the e⁄ective land usage in emission
generation is:
Le








i Treatments of set-asided land (i.e. non-fertilised grass strips, hedges,
trees, watercourses, ditches) make set-aside land more e⁄ective in emission
abatement as if the farmer has set aside more land. Given that @ei
@Lnc < 0,
the e⁄ective set-aside land in emission generation is:
Le
nc = (1 + tnc
i )









i Treatments of labour (i.e. vocational training, advisory services) a⁄ect
the impact of labour (‘) on both crop yields and emission ￿ ows. Let ‘e
y be
the e⁄ective labour in crop yields generation and ‘e
e the e⁄ective labour in
emission generation, involving:
‘e




> 0 and ‘e





Even though t‘ is classi￿ed with secondary choices, it is a mixed production
choice a⁄ecting both crop yields and emission ￿ ows.













Treatments involve costs that can either be self-￿nanced fully (TCo






through a rural development (RDi) ￿in the form of a public
VA - involving the granting of subsidies per unit of undertaken treatment. The
associated costs are respectively given:
TCo = rjtx
ij + ￿tnc
i + ctc + dt‘
TCRD = TCo
i ￿ RDi = rj (1 ￿ sx)tx
ij + ￿(1 ￿ snc)tnc





where rj is the vector of the per unit cost of the m input usage treatments and
sx the associated per unit subsidy characterized by 1 > sx > 0, ￿ and snc are
the per unit cost and subsidy of tnc
i , c and sc the per unit cost and subsidy
of tc
i, while d and s‘ the per unit cost and subsidy of t‘ in the competitive
market. Finally, RDi = rjsxtx
ij +￿snctnc
i +csctc
i +ds‘t‘ represents the amount
of payments provided by Pillar II to the representative farmer i.
RD payments are subject to both performance standards and the cross-
compliance principle, involving a probabilistic reduction (or even cancellation)
of provided rural development payments by the amount:
~ RDp￿
￿ ￿ Qi ￿ Qi
￿
where ~ RD = rjsxtx
ij + ￿snctnc
i + csctc
i = RD ￿ ds‘t‘ given that the aid for
vocational training is not conditional to the land quality constraint.










i = P(1 + s)f(xi;Lc
i;(1 + t‘)‘) ￿ wx ￿ v‘ + ￿1Lc (15)
+￿2
￿￿ L ￿ Lc￿
￿ (TCo ￿ RD)
subject to
Lc ￿ ~ Lc
Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi
Given that the amount of undertaken vocational training is predetermined by
the Commission, training cannot be a choice variable. Thus t‘ represents advice
and s‘ = 0,.
35In the absence of farming standards in the provision of DPs and RD payments the max-
imization problems reduce to:
￿i = P(1 + s)f(xi;Lc
i;(1 + t‘)‘) ￿ wjxij ￿ v‘ + DP1 + DP2 ￿ (TCo ￿ RD)
18￿ Deviating Strategy.
max￿NC
i = P(1 + s)f(xi;Lc
i;(1 + t‘)‘) ￿ wx ￿ v‘ ￿ TCo + ds‘t‘ (16)
+
h
￿1Lc + ~ RD
i￿
1 ￿ p￿
￿ ￿ Qi ￿ Qi
￿￿
+ ￿2
￿￿ L ￿ Lc￿n
1 ￿ p￿(~ Lc ￿ Lc)
o
Optimality conditions indicate that nonzero secondary production choices
allow both for increased usage of (xij;Lc
i;‘i) along with attainment of the land
quality constraint. Comparisons between the environmental performance of the
regulated population under the various CAP regimes in terms of main and sec-
ondary production choices are conducted, where the set of examined regimes
is enriched by: (i) extended full coupling regime, involving the granting of both
coupled and Pillar II payments, (ii) extended partial decoupling regime charac-
terised by coupled, decoupled and RD payments, (iii) extended full decoupling
regime that provides decoupled and RD payments, and (v) rural development
regime involving only rural development subsidies.36
In the extended case regime is environmentally inferior to regime , in the











































‘ (qih;tih) > 0 and ￿
g









t‘ (qih;tih) < 0







be the vector of main production








is the vector of the
associated secondary production choices.
Analysis indicated that if CAP regimes associated with CMOs are extended
with RD payments, the environmental performance of the population of farmers
is enhanced relative to the case where no RD payments are provided. On the
other hand, regimes involving production subsidies involve higher labour usage
treatment to regimes providing either decoupled and / or Pillar II payments,
since higher allows farmers both to attain the land quality standard and increase
the received amount of coupled payments.
Despite the environmental bene￿ts arising from the second pillar of CAP,
there is no clear evidence that the transition from the FC regime to the regime
of partially or fully decoupled payments (i.e. Agenda 2000 regimes), and ulti-
mately to the rural development CAP regime (i.e. 2003 CAP reform), enhances
the environmental performance of farmers￿population. In particular, when eval-
uating the optimality conditions of the initial CAP regime (i.e. full coupling)
at the equilibrium production choices of the rural development regime, there is
clear evidence that it involves higher usage of the main production choices, in
the sense that qi￿
2 > qi￿
8b, since it simultaneously holds:


































































On the other hand, their relative environmental performance in terms of sec-
ondary production choices is ambiguous. Even though the RD regime involves







, its relative per-
formance in terms of t‘













































































Hence, on the whole the environmental performance under the RD regime
cannot be clearly inferred as superior to the relative environmental performance
under the FC regime. In a similar way is assessed the relative environmental
performance of the full coupling regime compared to the partially and fully de-
coupled CAP regime, providing identical results. Finally, even in the absence
of an enforcement mechanism or the presence of a lax mechanism, the environ-
mental performance of the deviating to the compliant strategy is uncertain.37
6 Conclusions
Common Agricultural Policy measures are classi￿ed among the factors responsi-
ble for the imbalance in the agricultural-environment relation. Following wide-
spread criticism, CAP reformers introduced the Agenda 2000 CAP reform that
is considered to be pioneering from an environmental aspect. Given that lim-
ited theoretical analysis regarding the environment impacts and the long term
viability of this regime has been undertaken, a conceptual theoretical model
of farming behaviour was developed to embody the basic reforms for the com-
mon market organizations and rural development. The generalized nature of















20the provided model allowed the assessment of the impacts of the various CAP
regimes characterised either by CMOs payments (i.e. full coupling, partial and
full decoupling regime), RD payments (i.e. rural development regime) or a
combination of CMOs and RD payments (i.e. extended full coupling, partial
and full decoupling regime), on the environmental performance of a representa-
tive farmer, and thus of a homogeneous population, in terms of primary and /
or secondary production choices. The policy e⁄ectiveness of Agenda 2000 was
evaluated by analysing the problem of optimal regulation of a population of
unboundedly rational agents both in a static and dynamic context, allowing the
assessment of the type of socially optimal Pillar I and Pillar II measures, along
with type of interdependence characterizing them. Finally, the long-run viabil-
ity of the 1999 CAP reform was assessed under the assumption of boundedly
rational agents through the framework of replicator dynamics.
Intervention via decoupled payments under both the absence and presence
of farming standards is environmentally preferable in terms of main production
choices to intervention via a combination of coupled and decoupled payments.
However, when the set of production choices is extended with secondary pro-
duction choices, then the relative environmental performance of the population
under the given CAP regimes of payments cannot be clearly inferred. There is
no clear evidence that the transition initially from the full coupling regime to
the intervention regime involving partial or full decoupling of Pillar I payments
both in the absence and provision of rural development payments (i.e. Agenda
2000 regimes), and ultimately to the intervention regime involving solely the
provision of second pillar payments (i.e. Mid-term review), induces the pop-
ulation of farmers to restrict main production choices and increase secondary
choices. Nevertheless, it is evident that the incorporation of farming constraints
and rural development measures enhances the environmental performance of the
regulated population.
21Appendix
Table 1: The relative environmental performance of the CAP regimes g and h
in terms of input usage (xi) and labor usage (‘)
￿(x)
g
h = xg ￿ xh and ￿(‘)
g
h = ‘g ￿ ‘h
gnh 2 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7a 7b 8a 8b
1 ￿ ￿ ? 0 + ￿ ? ￿ ? 0 + 0 +
2 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + + +
3a + + + 0 + 0 + + + + +
3b ? + ￿ 0 (?) ￿ 0 (+) ? + ? + (?)
4a + ￿ ? ￿ ? 0 + 0 +
4b ￿ ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ (?) ￿ 0 (+) ￿ 0 (?)
5a + 0 + + + + +
5b ￿ 0 (+) ? + ? +
6a + + + + +
6b ? + ? + (?)
7a + 0 +
7b ￿ 0 (+)
8a +











gnh 2 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7a 7b 8a 8b
1 + ? ? ? ? + ? ? ? ? ? 0 ￿
2 ? ? ? ? 0 ￿ ? ? ? ? ￿ ￿
3a ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ (?) ? ? 0 ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ (?) ? ?
3b ? ￿ ? ? + (?) 0 (￿) ? ￿ (?) ? ?
4a ￿ (?) ? ? + ? 0 ￿ (?) ? ?
4b ? ? + (?) + (?) + (?) 0 (￿) ? ?
5a ￿ ? ? ? ? ￿ ￿
5b ? ? ? ? ? ￿
6a ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ (?) ? ?
6b ? ￿ ? ?
7a ￿ (?) ? ?
7b ? ?
8a ￿
Table 3: The relative environmental performance of the CAP regimes
g and h in terms of input usage treatment (tx), land usage treatment








gnh 2 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7a 7b 8a 8b
1 0 0 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 0 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3a ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3b + 0 ? ￿ (?) ? ￿ ? ￿ ? ￿ (?)
4a ￿ ￿ ￿ (?) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (?)
4b ? ￿ (?) ? ￿ ? ￿ ? ￿ (?)
5a ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿
5b + 0 (￿) + 0 (?) + 0
6a ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿
6b + 0 + 0 (+)
7a ￿ 0 ￿
7b + 0
8a ￿
Table 4: The relative environmental performance of the CAP regimes







gnh 2 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 7a 7b 8a 8b
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿
2 0 ￿ + ? 0 ￿ 0 ￿ + ? + ?
3a ￿ + ? 0 ￿ 0 ￿ + ? + ?
3b + + + 0 (?) + 0 (￿) + + (?) + + (?)
4a ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿
4b ? ￿ (?) ? ￿ + 0 (￿) + 0 (?)
5a ￿ 0 ￿ + ? + ?
5b + 0 (￿) + + (?) + +
6a ￿ + ? + ?
6b + + + +
7a ￿ 0 ￿
7b + 0 (+)
8a ￿
where (1) unregulated regime (UN), (2) full coupling regime (FC),
(3) partial decoupled regime (PD), (4) full decoupled regime (FD),
(5) extended full coupling regime (EFC), (6) extended partial decou-
pled regime (EPD), (7) extended full decoupled regime (EFD), (8)
rural development regime (RD). Let (a) denote the absence and (b)
the presence of performance standards within the examined CAP
regime.














h tables, implies that regime h involves higher usage of the given main






denotes that regime h sets aside more land. If the indication is modi￿ed un-
der the deviating strategy compared to the compliant strategy, then the altered
indication is shown in parentheses.
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